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“Money often costs too much.” — Ralph Waldo Emerson2
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ABSTRACT
In 2018, following both the repeal of federal privacy regulations and
the passage of Europe’s Global Data Protection Regulation, better known
as GDPR, California enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act. The
Act, or CCPA, is a large step forward in U.S. privacy regime, particularly
because many of the largest technology companies in the world are at
home in the Golden State. Following its passage, however, many have
suggested that the CCPA may in fact violate the Commerce Clause, and
specifically the Inverse or Dormant Commerce Clause, because of its
outsized economic impact. No academic literature has yet fleshed out this
claim, however. This article seeks to do just that. The article begins by
reviewing the science and principles underlying targeted ads and the data
shared to advertisers that give rise to the privacy concerns animating the
CCPA. In Section II, the article reviews the CCPA, including the events
leading up to its passage, the law’s text, its comparison to GDPR, and its
initial critical reception. Finally, in Section III, the article lays out the
Dormant Commerce Clause’s jurisprudence—including the various
standards and tests under which state statutes are analyzed to determine
whether they violate the clause—and applies the CCPA to the Clause,
arriving at the conclusion that the Act should survive any Commerce
Clause challenge.
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I. INTRODUCTION
From Facebook’s Cambridge Analytica scandal3 to the data breaches
of federal and state government organizations,4 as well as countless
private companies,5 digital privacy has been thrust into the forefront of
the modern psyche. But the rise in concern about digital privacy parallels
the rise of the digital ecosystem’s ubiquity in society’s day-to-day life,
simply lagging by a few years.
One particular aspect of the larger debate on the “right to privacy”—
an idea which “dates back to a law review article published in December
of 1890 by two young Boston lawyers, Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis”6—pertains to the sale of one’s personal information. Put
simply, upon logging onto a particular website, a person unwittingly gave
over certain information to the site, which can then catalogue the data and
sell it. The ethics of these sorts of offerings and purchases are hotly
contested,7 even when the data is sufficiently anonymized to shield userspecific data.
The Golden State—California—has sought to change all that.
California, the home of Silicon Valley and much of the tech industry, took
up legislation on the subject of data privacy to fill the void left by
insufficient federal law. And so it came to be that on June 28, 2018,
California enacted the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
(CCPA).8
The Act, in short, puts in place much more robust safeguards around
users’ data by demanding companies buying or selling such data adhere
to strict protocols that include giving users proper notice of what data is
being collected and sold and affording them the opportunity to opt out of
3. See, e.g., Kevin Granville, Facebook and Cambridge Analytica: What You Need to Know as
(Mar.
19,
2018),
Fallout
Widens,
N.Y.
TIMES
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/19/technology/facebook-cambridge-analytica-explained.html
[https://perma.cc/AWZ7-GSBG].
4. See, e.g., Evan Perez & Shimon Prokupecz, First on CNN: U.S. Data Hack May Be 4 Times
Larger
Than
the
Government
Originally
Said,
CNN
(June
24,
2015),
https://edition.cnn.com/2015/06/22/politics/opm-hack-18-milliion/index.html [https://perma.cc/WDG5Q77G].
5. See, e.g., Robert McMillan, Ryan Knutson & Deepa Seetharaman, Yahoo Discloses New
Breach of 1 Billion User Accounts, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/yahoodiscloses-new-breach-of-1-billion-user-accounts-1481753131
[https://perma.cc/FS7L-YKC9]
(explaining that Yahoo had 1 billion accounts hacked in 2013).
6. Dorothy J. Glancy, The Invention of the Right to Privacy, 21 ARIZ. L. REV. 1, 1 (1979).
7. See, e.g., Sarah Steimer, The Murky Ethics of Data Gathering in a Post-Cambridge Analytica
World, AM. MARKETING ASSN. (May 1, 2018), https://www.ama.org/marketing-news/the-murky-ethicsof-data-gathering-in-a-post-cambridge-analytica-world/ [https://perma.cc/7LRE-TWB8]. Such questions
of morality and ethics are not in the scope of this article, in no small part because they deserve their own
full-throated debates separate from California’s attempted regulation thereof.
8. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798.100–199 (West 2019).
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such efforts.
In doing so, the CCPA places a tremendous burden on those companies
that traffic in data. While said companies could forego the state, that
would present a significant obstacle, considering California’s economy is
larger than all but four countries in the world.9 In light of these
considerations, the CCPA engenders substantial Dormant Commerce
Clause concerns. While others have simply noted this potential
challenge,10 this article is the first to flesh out those concerns and
determine whether or not a Dormant Clause challenge to the CCPA is
viable and/or likely to succeed.
To do so, this article begins on an explanation of the science of Internet
data. Specifically, it looks at Internet Cookies—digital passport stamps
marking your browsing history—and how companies compile, analyze,
and sell that data. In Part II, the article reviews the CCPA, including the
long federal and state legislative history and context of the Act, as well as
the Act’s text itself. Part III explores Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and culminates in the application thereof to the CCPA; this
Part, and the article, concludes with the determination that the CCPA
should withstand a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge.
II. THE SCIENCE OF COOKIES AND THE MONEY IN TARGETED ADS
A. Flour, Butter, Water, and Sugar: The History and Basics of Cookies
Before delving into Internet regulations, it may be advantageous to
review the foundational science driving the Internet’s relevance—namely
HyperText Transfer Protocol (HTTP), also known as web cookies.
Lou Montulli, the developer of Lynx, one of the earliest web browsers,
also developed cookies in the early 1990s.11 Montulli—then working for
Netscape—“was trying to help web sites become viable commercial
enterprises.”12
9. Lisa Marie Segarra, California’s Economy Is Now Bigger Than All of the U.K., FORTUNE (May
5, 2018), https://fortune.com/2018/05/05/california-fifth-biggest-economy-passes-united-kingdom/
[https://perma.cc/7NBW-656K].
10. See, e.g., Eric Goldman, Ten Reasons Why California’s New Data Protection Law is
Unworkable, Burdensome, and Possibly Unconstitutional, TECH. & MARKETING LAW BLOG (July 9,
2018) https://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2018/07/ten-reasons-why-californias-new-data-protectionlaw-is-unworkable-burdensome-and-possibly-unconstitutional-guest-blog-post.htm
[https://perma.cc/629U-JE8P]; Alan Charles Raul et al., California Enacts Broad Privacy Laws Modeled
on GDPR, SIDLEY AUSTIN: DATA MATTERS (June 29, 2018), https://datamatters.sidley.com/californiaenacts-broad-privacy-laws-modeled-on-gdpr/ [https://perma.cc/ZG9R-9B4Y].
11. Simon Hill, Are Cookies Crumbling Our Privacy? We Asked An Expert To Find Out, DIG.
TRENDS (Mar. 29, 2015, 10:00 A.M. PST), https://www.digitaltrends.com/computing/history-of-cookiesand-effect-on-privacy/ [https://perma.cc/2U4G-MQJL].
12. Solveig Singleton, How Cookie-Gate Crumbles, CATO INSTITUTE: COMMENTARY (July 11,
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As Montulli quickly realized, websites were not very good at customer
relations. In an ordinary store in the “real” world of malls and main street,
the shopkeeper can eyeball shoppers coming in to identify regular
customers, check out suspicious characters, get a feel for whether his
visitors are locals or tourists, likely buyers or merely browsers, and make
sure that shoppers can find what they are looking for. Web sites had no
mechanism for collecting this information; on the Internet, every visitor
was an anonymous stranger.13
Montulli’s invention changed this for websites. As the Federal Trade
Commission explains,
[a] cookie is information saved by your web browser. When you visit a
website, the site may place a cookie on your web browser so it can
recognize your device in the future. If you return to that site later on, it can
read that cookie to remember you from your last visit and keep track of you
over time.14

The browser accessing said website also stores personal information, such
as the location (via an IP address) and other identifiable information of
the website’s user. Importantly, cookies also help with website
personalization. As Google explains in a Help Center post regarding its
targeted ads platform, AdSense:
If you shop on a website, a cookie allows the website to remember which
items you've added to your virtual shopping cart. If you set preferences on
a website, a cookie allows the website to remember your preferences the
next time you visit. Or if you sign into a website, the website might use a
cookie to recognize your browser later on, so that you don't have to sign in
again . . . All these applications depend on the information stored in
cookies.15

There is also a distinction between first-party and third-party cookies.
As the nomenclature would suggest, “[f]irst-party cookies are dropped by
the publisher or website owner when a user visits their own site.”16 On

2000),
https://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/how-cookiegate-crumbles
[https://perma.cc/8JFN-CYMT].
13. Id.
14. Internet Cookies, FED. TRADE COMM., https://www.ftc.gov/site-information/privacypolicy/internet-cookies [https://perma.cc/3BZD-Y8FP] (last updated Mar. 2018).
15. How
AdSense
uses
cookies,
GOOGLE:
ADSENSE
HELP,
https://support.google.com/adsense/answer/7549925?hl=en&ref_topic=1628432
[https://perma.cc/FGH7-LTEM]. See also What Are Cookies?, INDIANA UNIVERSITY: KNOWLEDGE BASE
(Jan. 18, 2018), https://kb.iu.edu/d/agwm [https://perma.cc/HC8Q-PD93] (“When you select preferences
at a site that uses this option, the server places the information in a cookie. When you return, the server
uses the information in the cookie to create a customized page for you.”).
16. Jessica Davies, Know Your Cookies: A Guide To Internet Ad Trackers, DIGIDAY (Nov. 1,
2017), https://digiday.com/media/know-cookies-guide-internet-ad-trackers/ [https://perma.cc/448PT5XR].
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the other hand, third-party cookies “are created by ‘parties’ other than the
website that the user is currently visiting—providers of advertising,
retargeting, analytics and tracking services.”17
In sum, web cookies are a user’s digital passport: keeping accurate
records of Internet history, along with much of a user’s identifying
information, and providing website administrators with never before seen
user data.
B. Now Add Oatmeal: Further Iterations of Cookies
Traditional cookies have now taken on a life of their own in that there
are now multiple types of cookies that track different things and perform
different functions.
Consider the Facebook pixel, the social media giant’s user-specific
cookie. The Facebook pixel is different from other types of cookies in that
it tracks people, not devices. With traditional cookies, if a person visited
a site on three different devices, analytics would track that as three
separate visits by three separate people. Facebook, on the other hand,
tracks visits across devices, so that multiple devices can be attributed to
one person.18
A review of one’s passport can give way to exceptionally important
data. For example, one could learn where this author has been outside the
United States and how frequently, in addition to his date of birth, mailing
address, hair color, eye color, height, and gender identification. And that
is only a passport. Now imagine just how detailed one’s web browser
history can be and what a third party could learn about a given user from
a review thereof.19
Data itself is one thing, but how exactly do cookies transfer into
targeted ads and, thus profit for companies? Put another way, how do
advertisers or data brokers make money off of users for free?

17. Michal Wlosik & Michael Sweeney, What’s the Difference Between First-Party and ThirdParty Cookies?, CLEARCODE, https://clearcode.cc/blog/difference-between-first-party-third-partycookies/ [https://perma.cc/3LHV-DWZK].
18. Betsy McLeod, What Is A Facebook Pixel? A Business Owner’s Guide, BLUE CORONA (Apr.
14,
2017),
https://www.bluecorona.com/blog/guide-to-facebook-pixel-retargeting
[https://perma.cc/43K3-VZMW].
19. This is the central thesis of the “mosaic theory” in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g.,
Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311 (2012). Under this
theory, “large scale or long-term collections of data reveal details about individuals in ways that are
qualitatively different than single instances of observation[.]” Paul Rosenzweig, In Defense of the Mosaic
Theory, LAWFARE BLOG (Nov. 29, 2017), https://www.lawfareblog.com/defense-mosaic-theory
[https://perma.cc/T4QW-NLWW].
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C. Like Mrs. Fields: Monetizing Cookies in Big Data
The digital ads business is estimated to gross more than $129 billion
from US advertisers in 2019.20 But how does it work? Without detailing
each of the unique streams of commerce for the myriad ways in which
online advertising takes place, the core idea remains a constant:
companies “gather[] information about users and group[] them into
sellable ‘segments.’”21 But even without such detailed transactional
flows, some more detail is worth expounding upon.
Consider an independent merchant selling women’s running shoes in
the fictional town of Ames, in the fictional county of Ames County, in the
fictional State of Ames.22 The merchant’s ideal customers—and thus the
individuals to whom the merchant wants to advertise—are women that
run who live in the Town of Ames. Secondarily, the merchant would also
want to advertise to female runners that shop online for their shoes, even
if they are located outside of Ames altogether.
Location is something fairly easy to discern via one’s IP address. IP
addresses “will not give a street address,” but they very well can reveal
the city in which the user is surfing the web.23 An IP address will not,
however, reveal a user’s gender, let alone if she is active via running as
opposed to, say, weightlifting (in which your inventory is largely
inapposite). That’s where this hypothetical merchant can use cookies.
If a user has repeatedly viewed active wear, or athleisure, brands, it is
a decent bet that he or she is active and willing to purchase athletic apparel
online. And if he or she has viewed running-specific sites such as those
that scope out running trails, track one’s running distance, or offer tips to
would-be runners, that is another important clue. This is especially true
if those sites are themselves specifically gendered. Now, of course, a
merchant—or an advertising agency—never knows the true identity of
the user, but they can create a “profile” with fairly intimate information
derived from deductions like those above. That information can then be
aggregated across multiple populations and filtered accordingly such that
merchants aim to advertise to that user specifically.
20. Kurt Wagner, Digital Advertising In The US Is Finally Bigger Than Print And Television,
VOX:RECODE (Feb. 20, 2019), https://www.vox.com/2019/2/20/18232433/digital-advertising-facebookgoogle-growth-tv-print-emarketer-2019 [https://perma.cc/7YYK-CZ3Z].
21. Getting To Know You, ECONOMIST (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.economist.com/specialreport/2014/09/11/getting-to-know-you [https://perma.cc/ZY2Q-BVJ2].
22. This is a tradition at Harvard Law School, wherein professors set their exams in such a fictional
world so as to avoid bringing in any biases from a state’s common law or statutes. The name “Ames” is
in honor of James Barr Ames, the Law School’s former dean and one of the foremost legal professors in
history. See, generally, William D. Lewis, James Barr Ames, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 289 (1910).
23. Cale Guthrie Weissman, What is an IP address and what can it reveal about you?, BUS.
INSIDER (May 18, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/ip-address-what-they-can-reveal-about-you2015-5 [https://perma.cc/C6N2-6DN5].
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There are multiple ways to do this. Merchants can advertise directly
on a social media platform such that the user will see it when browsing
on the platform. Alternatively, they can advertise through a company that
owns what’s called banner ad space, better conceived as digital real estate
on websites.24 Every time one goes to a website and sees adverts on the
sides or atop it, those are akin to digital billboards, controlled by a
company.25 Otherwise, merchants can simply go to an advertising agency
who can allocate their money in the way it believes is best—with the
merchant’s input, of course.26 Even under this last scenario, the owner of
the website (the “publisher” in advertising parlance) typically gets a large
percentage of the amount the original merchant paid the advertising
agency.
At the end of the day, companies compiling the data and creating
profiles about specific users are making tremendous amounts of money
off of any given user by analyzing his or her browsing history.27 To be
sure, users have a simple defense: they can delete their cookies and/or set
their browsers to block all cookies for future browsing. Even if a user
blocks cookies, advertisements will still be posted, meaning publishers
(and potentially advertising agencies) will still profit off of a user—albeit
less so; as the advertisement is less precisely targeted, it is rendered less
valuable.
III. THE CCPA’S HISTORICAL CONTEXT AND TEXT
The CCPA, like all laws, is a reaction to the circumstances facing the
legislative body.28 Interpreting it—the necessary prerequisite for
24. Interactive Advertising Bureau, The Evolution of Online Display Advertising, YOUTUBE (May
13, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1C0n_9DOlwE.
25. Id.
26. The customer is always right, after all. Additionally, of note is the fact that real-time bidding
technology, or programmatic bidding, further drives the digital advertising market. Again, foregoing
specifics in the above scenarios, the advertising spaces referenced above are not simply purchased, but
are auctioned at light speed with pre-determined inputs. For a primer on real-time bidding, see Jack
Marhsall, WTF is real-time bidding?, DIGIDAY (Feb. 17, 2014), https://digiday.com/media/what-is-realtime-bidding/ [https://perma.cc/7XTT-2KRN].
27. Again, this article does not endeavor to make moral pronouncements on the practice one way
or another.
28. Cf. Tracey L. Meares et. al., Updating the Study of Punishment, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1171, 1204
(2004) (“lawmaking is a dynamic process: Courts, to be sure, react to the policy judgments reflected in
legislative enactments, but legislatures also react to the policy judgments made by courts when they
interpret statutes.”); Douglas Kriner, Accountability Without Deliberation? Separation of Powers in
Times of War, 95 B.U.L. REV. 1275, 1275 (2015) (“Congress’ reactive stance is a product of the incentives
facing individual members.”); Neal Devins, Congressional Factfinding and the Scope of Judicial Review:
A Preliminary Analysis, 50 DUKE L.J. 1169, 1185 (2001) (“To start, Congress is a reactive institution . . .
.”); Richard D. Friedman, Tribal Myths: Ideology and the Confirmation of Supreme Court Nominations,
95 YALE L.J. 1283, 1287 n.24 (1986) (“the Constitution gives the President a selective function, and the
Congress a reactive one”).
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adjudicating its constitutionality—requires an understanding of the
context leading up to its passage in addition to the text itself. This section
aims to elucidate both, diving deep into its history and painstakingly
detailing its text.
A. How the Measure Came to Be
1. Federal Action . . . And Re-action
Former Congressman turned Chief Judge of the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals Abner Mikva once referred to Congress as a “reactive
body unable to enact legislation until the problem at hand reaches crisis
proportions.”29 So, too, it seems is the California state legislature, as the
CCPA’s passage is the culmination of a reaction-driven narrative arc.
Broadly speaking, digital privacy has enjoyed an interesting history,
and for sake of the butterfly effect, the CCPA and prior privacy
regulations could be traced back to the very roots of the Internet. Cutting
to the chase, the appropriate timeline begins in 2012, when the Federal
Trade Commission (FTC)30 issued a report entitled Protecting Consumer
Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses and
Policymakers.31 The FCC drew upon that report, as well as other
administrative guidance, to develop and “adopt a framework that provides
heightened protections for sensitive customer information” online.32
As part of that framework, the FCC, in 2016, passed landmark rules
“that force all internet providers . . . to obtain explicit consent from
subscribers before selling data about online behavior to third-party
marketers.”33 Like both technology and legislation, the measure was
reactive: “supporters of the new regulations, including Democrats,
29. Abner J. Mikva, How Well Does Congress Support and Defend the Constitution?, 61 N.C.L.
REV. 587, 609 (1983).
30. In the FTC’s own words, “The FTC has been the chief federal agency on privacy policy and
enforcement since the1970s, when it began enforcing one of the first federal privacy laws – the Fair Credit
Reporting Act. Since then, rapid changes in technology have raised new privacy challenges, but the FTC’s
overall approach has been consistent: The agency uses law enforcement, policy initiatives, and consumer
and business education to protect consumers’ personal information and ensure that they have the
confidence to take advantage of the many benefits of the ever-changing marketplace.” Protecting
Consumer Privacy and Security, FED. TRADE COMM, https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/mediaresources/protecting-consumer-privacy-security [https://perma.cc/FL25-H6KN].
31. Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: Recommendations for Businesses
and Policymakers, FED. TRADE COMM’N, (2012), https://www.ftc.gov/reports/protecting-consumerprivacy-era-rapid-change-recommendations-businesses-policymakers [https://perma.cc/U9T4-LBMY].
32. FCC, FCC Docket 16-106, 31 FCC Rcd. 13911, PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF CUSTOMERS
OF BROADBAND AND OTHER TELECOMMUNICATIONS SERVICES, (Nov. 2, 2016).
33. April Glaser, Internet Providers Now Need Permission To Share Or Sell Your Web Browsing
Data, VOX: RECODE (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.recode.net/2016/10/28/13442880/internet-providersfcc-permission-share-web-browsing-data-opt-in [https://perma.cc/3U6F-XCPB].
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consumer groups and privacy advocates, fear that Internet service
providers are assembling detailed files on their customers without their
consent.”34 Compelled by such fears, the
tough new Federal Communications Commission regulations . . .
require[d] broadband companies to get explicit customer permission before
using or sharing most of their personal information. The data include
health information, website browsing history, app usage and the
geographic information from mobile devices. The rules also tighten data
security requirements.35

The new regulations were far from a solution, as they did not in any
way dictate how Internet platforms such as Facebook, Google, and Apple
were to comport with the regulations.36 Nevertheless, the regulations
were a landmark step in Internet regulation—at least temporarily.
Shortly after a new Congress and Presidential administration took their
respective oaths and began legislating, Sen. Jeff Flake and 23 Republican
co-sponsors introduced a resolution under the Congressional Review Act
(CRA)37 to nullify the FCC’s regulations.38 In a 50-48 vote, the measure
passed the Senate, with lawmakers voting down party lines.39 Within
weeks, the House followed the Senate in another tight vote, 215 to 205,
and the FCC regulations became null and void.40
2. Concurrent, then Subsequent, State Measures
“[T]he CCPA is the brainchild of an Oakland real estate developer,

34. Jim Puzzanghera, House Sends Trump Bill to Kill Landmark Broadband Privacy Regulations,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-fcc-privacy-house-20170328story.html [https://perma.cc/47GG-QXST].
35. Id.
36. April Glaser, Internet Providers Now Need Permission To Share Or Sell Your Web Browsing
Data, VOX: RECODE (Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.recode.net/2016/10/28/13442880/internet-providersfcc-permission-share-web-browsing-data-opt-in [https://perma.cc/3U6F-XCPB].
37. The Congressional Review Act (CRA), passed in 1996 as part of the Small Business
Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act, endows Congress with the authority to invalidate rules established
by federal agencies immediately following the issuance of the prospective rule, provided that both
chambers of Congress agree by a simple majority. MAEVE P. CAREY, ALISSA M. DOLAN, & CHRISTOPHER
M. DAVIS, THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS i (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43992.pdf. If the President were to veto such a measure, both Houses could
override the veto as well. See id. at 1.
38. Jon Brodkin, Senate Votes To Let ISPs Sell Your Web Browsing History to Advertisers,
ARSTECHNICA (Mar. 23, 2017), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/03/senate-votes-to-let-isps-sellyour-web-browsing-history-to-advertisers/ [https://perma.cc/2795-697Z].
39. Id.
40. Chris Moran, House Votes To Allow Internet Service Providers To Sell, Share Your Personal
Information, CONSUMER REPORTS (May 4, 2018), https://www.consumerreports.org/consumerist/housevotes-to-allow-internet-service-providers-to-sell-share-your-personal-information/
[https://perma.cc/6A27-HPW8].
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Alastair Mactaggart, who triggered this process by spending $3.5 million
of his own money to push for a ballot proposition on data privacy.”41
Mactaggart “started worrying about data privacy after talking with a
Google engineer.”42 To assuage his fears, he worked to get an initiative
on the ballot to govern data privacy.
Following a deliberative process, the ballot’s “language was set” and
“the signatures were collected, but the initiative never made it to the
ballot.”43 Instead, the result of the initiative process was the CCPA—a
watered down version of the ballot initiative. As Wired magazine
described it, the bill was passed and signed “in a rush to defeat a stricter
privacy-focused ballot initiative that had garnered more than 600,000
signatures from Californians.”44
This is absolutely accurate. While the initiative was polling favorably
among the California citizenry, lawmakers and the tech industry had
significant “misgivings,” including thinking the bill was “unworkable.”45
What’s more, California ballot initiatives are “intentionally inflexible”
insofar as “the State Legislature cannot amend or repeal a passed
proposition without voter input – unless said proposition specifically
allows for legislative tampering . . . Thus, to amend or repeal a law passed
via the initiative process, the voters have to pass another ballot
proposition.”46
In light of these opposing forces, Mactaggart and the legislature
engaged in legislative horse-trading, bargaining for the law’s passage and
guaranteeing its enactment in exchange for the promise to withdraw the
initiative.47 Ultimately, on June 28, 2018, Gov. Jerry Brown signed Bill
No. 375, the California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018.48
41. Eric J. Savitz, California’s Data Privacy Law Will Create a New Headache for Tech
Companies, BARRON’S (June 29, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/california-consumer-privacyact-facebook-google-51561154337 [https://perma.cc/VS5J-53SM].
42. Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law With Implications For The Country,
NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 29, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/06/29/624336039/california-passes-strictinternet-privacy-law-with-implications-for-the-country [https://perma.cc/JYL9-5NPX].
43. Jason Tashea, California’s new data privacy law could change how companies do business in
BAR
J.
(Jan.
1,
2019),
the
Golden
State,
A M.
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/gdpr_california_data_privacy_law
[https://perma.cc/KQ2P-5VYD].
44. Issie Lapowsky, California Unanimously Passes History Privacy Bill, WIRED (June 28, 2018),
https://www.wired.com/story/california-unanimously-passes-historic-privacy-bill/
[https://perma.cc/L2JE-NLGL].
45. Tashea, supra note 43.
46. Carson Bruno, Is It Time To Reconsider California’s Initiative System?, HOOVER INSTITUTION
(Aug. 30, 2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/it-time-reconsider-californias-initiative-system
[https://perma.cc/R6C7-WDCB]; see also Tashea, supra note 43 (“California ballot initiatives, if passed,
are hard to amend.”).
47. See Adler, supra note 42.
48. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y.
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The law, effective January 1, 2020, purports to “give residents of the
state more control over the information businesses collect on them and
impose new penalties on businesses that don’t comply.”49 Whether that
is indeed true depends on the statute’s text as well as whether it can
withstand constitutional scrutiny.
B. Without Further Ado … Law
Upon its passing, CNN called the CCPA the “strictest online privacy
law in the country”;50 the New York Times referred to it as “sweeping”;51
and the Washington Post considered it “one of the toughest U.S.
regulations.”52 Whether the law is worthy of such plaudits may well
depend on its execution as well as whether the law is amended prior to its
enforcement—a process which has already begun.53 To decide who is
right, we must interpret the law itself. “Thus, our inquiry begins with
the statutory text[.]”54
1. Governing Data Collection, Sales, and Consumer Rights
The CCPA states that if businesses collect information, they must
“inform consumers as to the categories of personal information to be
collected and the purposes for which the categories of personal
information shall be used.”55 An individual consumer can also “request
that [the] business . . . disclose to that consumer the categories and
specific pieces of personal information the business has collected.”56
Once a business has collected the information, it can then sell that
information for profit—this is the very profit engine that powers many
Internet-based companies. But, the law reads, businesses “that sell[ ]
TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacylaw.html [https://perma.cc/8D5H-LA64].
49. Lapowsky, supra note 44.
50. Heather Kelly, California Passes Strictest Online Privacy Law In The Country, CNN (June
29, 2018),
http://money.cnn.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-consumer-privacy-act/index.html?iid=EL
[https://perma.cc/MHL4-4VHP].
51. Wakabayashi, supra note 48.
52. Tony Romm, California Legislators Just Adopted Tough New Privacy Rules Targeting
Facebook, Google and Other Tech Giants, WASH. POST, (June 28, 2018 6:33 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/06/28/california-lawmakers-just-adopted-toughnew-privacy-rules-targeting-facebook-google-other-tech-giants/.
53. See Sam Adriance, Amendments to California Privacy Law Expand Exemption for Consumer
Financial Data, NAT’L L. REV. (Sept. 6, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/amendments-tocalifornia-privacy-law-expand-exemption-consumer-financial-data [https://perma.cc/UBE2-8VTS].
54. BedRoc Ltd., LLC v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 183 (2004).
55. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b) (2019).
56. CIV. § 1798.100(a).
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consumers’ personal information to third parties shall provide notice to
consumers.”57 As well, consumers may “direct a business that sells
personal information about the consumer to third parties not to sell the
consumer’s personal information.”58
Beyond the collection and sale of information, the law stipulates
consumers’ rights and data brokers’ responsibilities with respect to
deleting data. Specifically, the law reads: “A consumer shall have the
right to request that a business delete any personal information about the
consumer which the business has collected from the consumer.”59 What’s
more, the law states that businesses must provide two methods for
consumers to request the business stop collecting and/or selling her
information or to delete her data altogether.60
The CCPA doesn’t just dictate what data brokers must do with respect
to compiling and selling data; it also has a strict reporting and disclosure
scheme that aim to keep users informed of their rights. As has been
recognized in other realms of law, “[s]imply put, if a member does not
know of his rights, he cannot exercise them.”61 President Kennedy
himself recognized that in the world of consumer rights, “if the consumer
is unable to choose on an informed basis, then his dollar is wasted, his
health and safety may be threatened, and the national interest suffers.”62
Actualizing President Kennedy’s beliefs, the CCPA requires that “[a]
business that collects personal information about consumers shall disclose
… the consumer’s rights to request the deletion of the consumer’s
personal information.”63
There are, importantly, a few exceptions to the rule. For example, these

57. CIV. § 1798.120(b).
58. CIV. § 1798.120(a).
59. CIV. § 1798.105(a).
60. CIV. § 1798.130(a)(1).
61. Knight v. Int’l Longshoremen's Ass’n., 457 F.3d 331, 344–45 (3d Cir. 2006) (quoting Thomas
v. Grand Lodge of Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 201 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2000)). Cf.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469 (1966) (“This warning is needed in order to make him aware not
only of the privilege, but also of the consequences of forgoing it. It is only through an awareness of these
consequences that there can be any assurance of real understanding and intelligent exercise of the
privilege. Moreover, this warning may serve to make the individual more acutely aware that he is faced
with a phase of the adversary system - that he is not in the presence of persons acting solely in his
interest.”).
62. President John F. Kennedy, Special Message to the Congress on Protecting the Consumer
Interest (March 15, 1962), https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/special-message-the-congressprotecting-the-consumer-interest [https://perma.cc/UX83-WJMA]. Ironically, this speech, given on
March 15, 1962, aimed to promote myriad aspects of consumer rights, including “[t]he right to be
informed” and “[t]he right to choose.” Id. So important was this speech that its anniversary is now
celebrated as World Consumer Rights Day. See World Consumer Rights Day, CONSUMERS INT’L,
https://www.consumersinternational.org/what-we-do/world-consumer-rights-day/
[https://perma.cc/P3XC-Q8AJ].
63. CIV. § 1798.105(b).
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provisions do not apply to medical information governed by the Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and analogous California
regulations.64 Additionally, “a business shall not sell the personal
information of consumers if the business has actual knowledge that the
consumer is less than 16 years of age.”65 Lastly, the law clearly states
that its provisions do not “restrict a business’s ability to [c]ooperate with
law enforcement agencies concerning conduct or activity that the
business, service provider, or third party reasonably and in good faith
believes may violate federal, state, or local law.”66
Lastly, the CCPA ensures that consumers are not barred from
exercising their rights under arbitration clauses67 and that they are not
discriminated against for having so exercised their rights, including by
denying or modifying pricing related to goods or services.68
2. Violations & Enforcement Thereof
In President Kennedy’s speech, which has since “become known as the
‘consumer bill of rights,’” he “also discussed an equally important issue:
how such rights would be enforced. After all, without enforcement,
consumer rights are just empty promises.”69 For that reason, California
wanted to ensure the enforcement regime was robust. To do so, the
legislature modeled the CCPA after its predecessor, the “California
Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), a 2003 law which required
website operators to ‘conspicuously’ post a privacy policy on their
website if the site collects personally identifiable information.”70
The CCPA empowers the California Attorney General to fine any
company or person found to have violated the Act $2,500 for each
inadvertent violation and $7,500 for each intentional violation.71 Note,
however, that violating the law multiple times or in multiple ways as it
pertains to one individual does not engender multiple individual
64. CIV. § 1798.145(c)(1)(A).
65. CIV. § 1798.120(c).
66. CIV. § 1798.145(a).
67. Any contractual provision “that purports to waive or limit in any way a consumer’s rights
under this title, including, but not limited to, any right to a remedy or means of enforcement, shall be
deemed contrary to public policy and shall be void and unenforceable.”
68. CIV. § 1798.125(a)(1) (“A business shall not discriminate against a consumer because the
consumer exercised any of the consumer’s rights[.]”).
69. Anne Fleming, Consumer Rights Are Worthless Without Enforcement, THE CONVERSATION
(Mar. 15, 2019), http://theconversation.com/consumer-rights-are-worthless-without-enforcement-113244
[https://perma.cc/XZH6-RF6K].
70. Nicholas Schmidt, Top 5 Operational Impacts of CCPA: Part 5 - Penalties and enforcement
mechanisms, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROFS. (Aug. 21, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/top-5-operationalimpacts-of-cacpa-part-5-penalties-and-enforcement-mechanisms/ [https://perma.cc/K7G4-X7FP].
71. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155(b) (2019).
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violations; rather, damages are accumulated on a per-user basis.72
Additionally, the violating entity may also be enjoined from certain
business practices, which could be quite the stick.
The enforcement process begins with an enforcement notice from the
California Attorney General’s office demanding the incident be cured
within 30 days.73 In the event a cure is possible and, within 30 days, the
business actually cures the noticed violation and provides the consumer
an express written statement that the violations have been cured and that
no further violations shall occur, no action for individual statutory
damages or class-wide statutory damages may be initiated against the
business.74
3. Applicability
Despite the breadth of the CCPA, it does not in fact apply to all
companies and corporations. Rather, it applies only to a business that:
(A) Has annual gross revenues in excess of twenty-five million dollars[;]
(B) Alone or in combination, annually buys, receives for the business’s
commercial purposes, sells, or shares for commercial purposes, alone or in
combination, the personal information of 50,000 or more consumers,
households, or devices[; or] (C) Derives 50 percent or more of its annual
revenues from selling consumers’ personal information.75

A rough estimate put the number of companies affected by the law at
approximately 507,280—just over half a million companies.76
Just as the law does not apply to all California businesses, it doesn’t
apply to all persons located in California. Instead, it applies only to those
permanently domiciled in California, i.e., those who are not persons
simply passing through for business or leisure.77 Notably, it also means
that the law applies to Californians not currently in the state.78

72. Schmidt, supra note 70.
73. CIV. § 1798.150(b).
74. CIV. § 1798.150(b).
75. CIV. § 1798.140(c).
76. Rita Heimes & Sam Pfeifle, New California Privacy Law to Affect More Than Half a Million
US Companies, INT’L ASS’N PRIV. PROFS. (July 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/new-california-privacylaw-to-affect-more-than-half-a-million-us-companies/ [https://perma.cc/9F6G-9633].
77. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(g) (2019) (defining a consumer as a “a natural person who is a
California resident, as defined in Section 17014 of Title 18 of the California Code of Regulations”); see
also CAL. CODE REGS. TIT. 18, § 17014 (a)(1) (defining a resident as “every individual who is in the State
for other than a temporary or transitory purpose.”).
78. CIV. § 1798.140(g) (defining a consumer as a “a natural person who is a California resident,
as defined in Section 17014 of Title 18 of the California Code of Regulations.”); see also CAL. CODE
REGS. TIT. 18, § 17014 (a)(2) (defining a resident to include “every individual who is domiciled in the
State who is outside the State for a temporary or transitory purpose”).
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4. Criticisms and Potential Weaknesses
While the Center for Humane Technology and Common Sense Media,
two technology non-profits, gave the CCPA largely positive remarks,79
not all privacy advocates are happy about the legislation. The ACLU of
California disparaged the CCPA, claiming it “utterly fail[ed] to provide
the privacy protections the public has demanded and deserves.”80 So too
have many large tech companies, though for an opposite reason:
implementation cost.81
Reports on the CCPA’s shortcomings have pointed to a few specific
loopholes.82 While consumers can bar the sale of information, companies
may nevertheless “share” that consumers have opted out or, more
importantly, if it “is necessary to perform a business purpose[].”83
Despite the aforementioned provision that businesses cannot discriminate
based on a request to restrict or stop data collection, issues still exist. In
practice, “the law allows companies to charge higher prices to consumers
who opt out of having their data sold” by justifying the higher price as a
business proposition.84 Indeed, a company “could charge a higher fee for
consumers who chose to limit sharing of their personal data . . . equal to
the ‘value provided by the consumer’s data[.]’”85
Additionally, the legislation states that a business is not “required to
comply with a consumer’s request to delete the consumer’s personal
information if it is necessary for the business or service provider to
maintain the consumer’s personal information in order to” complete the
transaction, detect security vulnerabilities, or use the information
internally.86 Another downfall of the CCPA is that consumers who want
to avail themselves of their new rights must submit a “verifiable consumer
request.” This means companies must take the time to confirm that the
79. Ina Fried, What They’re Saying: The Mixed Reactions to California’s New Privacy Law,
AXIOS (June 29, 2018), https://www.axios.com/mixed-reactions-to-california-privacy-law-d509c509ebec-41da-b54b-ddcfe67b59e8.html [https://perma.cc/9XPR-GPZ5].
80. Id.
81. Marc Vartabedian, Georgia Wells, & Lara O’Reilly, Businesses Blast California’s New DataPrivacy Law, WALL ST. J. (July 1, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/businesses-blastcalifornias-new-data-privacy-law-1530442800 [https://perma.cc/EGF7-4RFR].
82. Heather Kelly, California Passes Strictest Online Privacy Law In The Country, CNN (June
29, 2018, 12:03 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-consumer-privacyact/index.html?iid=EL [https://perma.cc/Y4YT-9D7W].
83. CIV. § 1798.140(t)(1)(C).
84. Kelly, supra note 82.
85. Tony Romm, California Lawmakers Just Adopted Tough New Privacy Rules Targeting
Facebook, Google and Other Tech Giants, WASH. POST (June 28, 2018, 6:33 PM),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2018/06/28/california-lawmakers-just-adopted-toughnew-privacy-rules-targeting-facebook-google-other-tech-giants/?utm_term=.27f3c750c46a
[https://perma.cc/2T52-WG5V].
86. CIV. § 1798.105(d).
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request came from the consumer, thereby slowing down the process by
which a consumer’s request can be acted upon.87
Finally, notwithstanding the text reviewed above, there remains a
question as to whom the law applies to. As the Sacramento Bee notes,
“[w]hile the new privacy law allows consumers to opt out of the sale of
personal information, many companies maintain they do not sell users’
personal information.”88
Once the law is in place, businesses, consumers, and advocacy groups
representing both sides will offer additional color to the law’s purported
strengths and weaknesses. At its outset, however, the law has not been
universally well-received.
5. Comparisons to GDPR
In addition to the aforementioned domestic context, California’s law
comes on the heels of the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR).89 News reports asserted that the law “is similar to
Europe’s new GDPR protections,”90 even arguing that the California law
is, in some ways, stricter than the GDPR. As such, a brief comparison to
the landmark European legislation is warranted. In its report on the new
law, the International Association of Privacy Professionals compared and
contrasted the two, stating that the California Law:
[1] Prescribes disclosures, communication channels (including toll-free
phone numbers) and other concrete measures that are not required to
comply with the EU GDPR.
[2] Contains a broader definition of ‘personal data’ and also covers
information pertaining to households and devices.
[3] Establishes broad rights for California residents to direct deletion of
data, with differing exceptions than those available under GDPR.
[4] Establishes broad rights to access personal data without certain
exceptions available under GDPR (e.g., disclosures that would implicate
the privacy interests of third parties).
[5] Imposes more rigid restrictions on data sharing for commercial
87. CIV. §§ 1798.100(d), 105(c).
88. Bryan Anderson, California's New Consumer Privacy Law Isn't As Sweeping As You Might
Think, SACRAMENTO BEE (July 5, 2018, 3:49 PM), https://www.sacbee.com/news/politicsgovernment/capitol-alert/article214064999.html.
89. Parliament and Council Regulation 2016/679 of April 27, 2016 on the Protection of Natural
Persons with regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of Such Data, and
Repealing Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter
GDPR].
90. Colin Lechler, California Just Passed One Of The Toughest Data Privacy Laws In The
VERGE
(June
28,
2018,
3:46
PM),
Country,
THE
https://www.theverge.com/2018/6/28/17509720/california-consumer-privacy-act-legislation-law-vote
[https://perma.cc/5NA5-8BZW].
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purposes.91

Others, however, have argued that the “California law is not as
expansive” as the GDPR.92 This argument partly rests on the GDPR’s
extraterritorial application. Article 3(2) of the GDPR reads:
This regulation applies to the processing of personal data of data subjects
who are in the Union by a controller or processor not established in the
Union, where the processing activities are related to:
a. The offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a payment
of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in the Union; or
b. The monitoring of their behavior as far as their behavior takes place
within the Union.93

As a Deloitte report summarizes, “European data protection law will
become applicable outside the borders of the European Union.”94
In another substantial example, the GDPR distinguishes between data
controllers—“the natural or legal person, public authority, agency or
other body which, alone or jointly with others, determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data”—and processors—“a
natural or legal person, public authority, agency or other body which
processes personal data on behalf of the controller.”95 Thereafter, the law
places different responsibilities on controllers and processors. The CCPA,
however, does not distinguish between the two operators.
In another difference to the CCPA, GDPR Article 33 holds:
In the case of a personal data breach, the controller shall without undue
delay and, where feasible, not later than 72 hours after having become
aware of it, notify the personal data breach to the supervisory authority
competent . . . unless the personal data breach is unlikely to result in a risk
to the rights and freedoms of natural persons.96

Controllers that fail to notify the supervisory authority of a personal data
breach within 72 hours must include a reason for the delay upon the
notice.97
The GDPR also requires each member state set up independent
91. Lothar Determann, Broad Data and Business Regulation, Applicable Worldwide, INT’L ASS’N
PRIV. PROFS. (JULY 2, 2018), https://iapp.org/news/a/analysis-the-california-consumer-privacy-act-of2018/ [https://perma.cc/233D-8KDN].
92. Daisuke Wakabayashi, California Passes Sweeping Law to Protect Online Privacy, N.Y.
TIMES (June 28, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/28/technology/california-online-privacylaw.html [https://perma.cc/L6Y4-8M2K].
93. GDPR, supra note 89, art. 3(2).
94. Alexander Garrelfs, GDPR Top Ten: #3 Extraterritorial Applicability of the GDPR, DELOITTE
(Apr.
3,
2017),
https://www2.deloitte.com/ch/en/pages/risk/articles/gdpr-extraterritorialapplicability.html [https://perma.cc/7VFN-R8W2].
95. GDPR, supra note 89, arts. 4(7), 4(8).
96. GDPR, supra note 89, art. 33.
97. Garrelfs, supra note 94.
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supervisory authorities to oversee the implementation and enforcement of
the law.98 Further, the GDPR also contemplates specific scenarios not
discussed in the CCPA, including how to deal with national identification
numbers, religious institutions, or scientific research.99
The enforcement regimes of the GDPR and CCPA also differ. Because
the GDPR necessarily starts with a different place—multiple sovereigns
in the European Union versus California as a lone actor—the GDPR
charges each member state to appoint its own Data Protection Authority
(DPA). A DPA is an “independent public authorit[y] that supervise[s],
through investigative and corrective powers, the application of the data
protection law.”100 As the Financial Times notes, “[i]n cross-border
cases, national DPAs will recommend enforcement actions to the EDPB
for a ruling. If the company were to dispute the EDPB ruling, the case
would be fought out in the member country’s court system.”101 Thus, no
one state has final, legally-binding authority over GDPR enforcement.
Even the fine structures are different—GDPR violations could cost
noncompliant companies four percent of their global profits,102 whereas
CCPA violations max out at $7,500 per intentional violation and $2,500
per unintentional violation (if not remedied in 30 days).103
In sum, CCPA and GDPR are premised on the same goal: privacy,
without too severe a cost on business. To achieve that singular aim, they
often overlap, but, when the entirety of each piece of legislation is
considered, they are definitively unique.104
IV. THE CCPA AND THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE—IS THE LAW
CONSTITUTIONAL?
As demonstrated above, the merits of the CCPA are certainly up for
debate. But one question looms large: is it constitutional? Specifically,
is it consistent with the Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine? To
determine this analysis, this Part first reviews Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Thereafter, this Part applies the appropriate tests to the
98. See generally GDPR, supra note 89, ch. 6.
99. See generally GDPR, supra note 89, ch. 9.
100. What are Data Protection Authorities (DPAs)?, EUROPEAN COMM’N,
https://ec.europa.eu/info/law/law-topic/data-protection/reform/what-are-data-protection-authoritiesdpas_en [https://perma.cc/RW4B-9L9V].
101. The Test for GDPR Will Be Its Enforcement, FIN. TIMES (May 24, 2018),
https://www.ft.com/content/f9a273a6-5e92-11e8-ad91-e01af256df68 [https://perma.cc/48C5-D6AK].
102. GDPR, supra note 89, art. 83.
103. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.155(b).
104. For a more exhaustive comparison, see ALICE MARINI ET AL., COMPARING PRIVACY LAWS:
GDPR
V.
CCPA,
FUTURE
OF
PRIVACY
FORUM
(2018),
https://fpf.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/11/GDPR_CCPA_Comparison-Guide.pdf [https://perma.cc/7L3B-4UVP].
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CCPA, including comparisons to Internet and unrelated regulations also
challenged under the Dormant Commerce Clause, to conclude that the
CCPA will survive constitutional scrutiny under the Dorman Commerce
Clause.
A. First Principles of the Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause endows Congress with the authority “to
regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states,
and with the Indian tribes.”105 The proper scope of the Clause, and the
legislation Congress may pass thereunder, has been and continues to be
debated in the legal community.106 Notwithstanding this thorny legal
issue, the Clause’s function does not stop at empowering Congress to
regulate inter- and intrastate commerce. “Though phrased as a grant of
regulatory power to Congress, the [Commerce] Clause has long been
understood to have a ‘negative’ aspect that denies the States the power
unjustifiably to discriminate against or burden the interstate flow of
articles of commerce.”107 In other words, the Negative, or Dormant,
Commerce Clause “is a restriction on State power that is not explicitly
articulated in the Constitution but that has been derived as a necessary
corollary of a power specifically conferred on Congress by the
Constitution.”108
This aspect of Commerce Clause doctrine, which in this article is
referred to as the Dormant Commerce Clause, can be traced back to
Gibbons v. Ogden and Chief Justice John Marshall.109 There, the Court
held that the Commerce Clause “invalidate[s] local laws that impose
commercial barriers or discriminate against an article of commerce by
reason of its origin or destination out of State.”110 Said otherwise, the
Clause bars laws that “erect barriers against interstate trade.”111
B. Dormant Commerce Clause Inquiries Step-By-Step
Evaluating the CCPA’s constitutionality under the Dormant
Commerce Clause requires multiple steps:

105. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
106. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1987).
107. Or. Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98 (1994).
108. Maryland State Comptroller of Treasury v. Wynne, 431 Md. 147, 161 (2013), aff'd sub nom.
Comptroller of Treasury of Maryland v. Wynne, 135 S. Ct. 1787 (2015).
109. See generally 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
110. C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 390 (1994).
111. Lewis v. BT Inv. Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27, 35 (1980).
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Courts evaluating dormant Commerce Clause claims conduct two
inquiries. First, the court “determine[s] whether the statute directly burdens
interstate commerce or discriminates against out-of-state interests,” in
which case the law is “virtually per se invalid and the [c]ourt applies the
strictest scrutiny.” “A statutory scheme can discriminate against out-ofstate interests in three different ways: (a) facially, (b) purposefully, or (c)
in practical effect.” Additionally, a “statute that directly controls
commerce occurring wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the
inherent limits of the enacting State’s authority.” But if the law “regulates
even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects
on interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits.” The party challenging the statute “bears the
burden of proof in establishing the excessive burden in relation to the local
benefits.”112

This section conducts these inquiries and ultimately concludes that the
CCPA will stand up to constitutional scrutiny under the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
1. The CCPA Does Not Discriminate Against Out-of-State Interests
As previously stated, a court hearing a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a state regulation or law must first “determine ‘whether the
statute directly burdens interstate commerce or discriminates against outof-state interests.’”113 In this context, “‘discrimination’ simply means
differential treatment of in-state and out-of-state economic interests that
benefits the former and burdens the latter.”114 Summing up this aspect of
Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine, the Supreme Court has stated:
The opinions of the Court through the years have reflected an alertness to
the evils of “economic isolation” and protectionism, while at the same time
recognizing that incidental burdens on interstate commerce may be
unavoidable when a State legislates to safeguard the health and safety of
its people. Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by state
legislation, a virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.115

State regulations with dual fee structures are obvious examples of
discriminatory conduct.
For example, “[i]n Chemical Waste
[Management, Inc. v. Hunt], [the Supreme Court] easily found Alabama’s
surcharge on hazardous waste from other States to be facially
112. Ades v. Omni Hotels Mgmt. Corp., 46 F. Supp. 3d 999, 1011–12 (C.D. Cal. 2014) (footnote
and internal citations omitted).
113. LensCrafters, Inc. v. Robinson, 403 F.3d 798, 802 (6th Cir. 2005) (quoting E. Ky. Res. v.
Fiscal Court of Magoffin County, Ky., 127 F.3d 532, 540 (6th Cir. 1997)).
114. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994).
115. City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 623–24 (1978).
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discriminatory because it imposed a higher fee on the disposal of out-ofstate waste than on the disposal of identical in-state waste.”116 Indeed,
bifurcated fee structures distinguishing in-state and out-of-state services
or products are the frequent target of meritorious Dormant Commerce
Clause causes of action.117 So too are export embargoes118 and local
processing laws.119
Multiple fee structures need not take the form of a specifically higher
fee in order to violate the Dormant Commerce Clause; they may also
come as a tax benefit only available to in-state persons or businesses.120
In New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, the Supreme Court struck
down “a provision that awards a tax credit against the Ohio motor vehicle
fuel sales tax for each gallon of ethanol sold (as a component of gasohol)
by fuel dealers, but only if the ethanol is produced in Ohio[.]”121
Arguably, the most appropriate case within Dormant Commerce
116. Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 99 (1994) (citing Chemical
Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334, 342 (1992)).
117. See, e.g., C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 386 (1994); BNSF
Ry. Co. v. California State Bd. of Equalization, No. 16-CV-04311-RS, 2016 WL 6393507, at *3 (N.D.
Cal. Oct. 28, 2016), aff'd sub nom. BNSF Ry. Co. v. California Dep't of Tax & Fee Admin., 904 F.3d 755
(9th Cir. 2018).
118. E.g., Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 474 (2005) (striking down Michigan statute that
“requires all out-of-state wine, but not all in-state wine, to pass through an in-state wholesaler and retailer
before reaching consumers” and New York statute that requires out-of-state wineries “to establish a
distribution operation in New York in order to gain the privilege of direct shipment.”); New England
Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982) (striking down New Hampshire statute disallowing
export of electricity generated within the state).
119. E.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 145 (1970) (striking down Arizona Act that
requires state-grown cantaloupes be packed within the state, stating that “the Court has viewed with
particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home State that
could more efficiently be performed elsewhere.”); South–Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467
U.S. 82 (1984) (plurality opinion) (striking down Alaska law requiring timber taken from state land be
processed in Alaska before export).
120. See Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 578–79 (1997)
(“That the tax discrimination comes in the form of a deprivation of a generally available tax benefit, rather
than a specific penalty on the activity itself, is of no moment.”).
121. New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 271 (1988). The latter portion of the
provision at issue in Limbach was also an important line of argument for the Court. In that case, the Ohio
credit would not only be applied for ethanol produced “in a State that grants similar tax advantages to
ethanol produced in Ohio.” Id. The state argued “that the availability of the tax credit to some out-of-state
manufacturers (those in States that give tax advantages to Ohio-produced ethanol) shows that the Ohio
provision, far from discriminating against interstate commerce, is likely to promote it, by encouraging
other States to enact similar tax advantages that will spur the interstate sale of ethanol.” Id. at 274. This
idea, one of “reciprocity,” has long been rejected. In a similar case, the Court unanimously held that a
state “may not use the threat of economic isolation as a weapon to force sister States to enter into even a
desirable reciprocity agreement.” Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976).
Indeed, the Court has warned that reciprocity provisions “risk[ ] generating the trade rivalries and
animosities, the alliances and exclusivity, that the Constitution and, in particular, the Commerce Clause
were designed to avoid.” Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 473 (2005). While the idea of reciprocity is
not a feature of the CCPA, and thus inapposite to potential arguments as to its constitutionality, it is worth
explicating at the outset for the sake of completeness.
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Clause jurisprudence is IMS Health Inc. v. Mills.122 This case adjudicated
the potentially discriminatory effects of state data privacy laws.123 The
factual predicate of that case is as follows:
In Maine and elsewhere, each time a prescription from a physician or other
licensed prescriber is given to a pharmacy, the pharmacy obtains a number
of facts that identify the prescriber. Data put together from multiple
transactions involving the same prescriber reveal certain patterns and
preferences, including her prescribing history, her choice of particular
brand-name drugs versus their generic equivalents, and the likelihood she
will adopt new brand-name drugs.124

The statute at issue in Mills “allow[ed] prescribers licensed in Maine
to choose not to make . . . identifying information available for use in
marketing prescription drugs to [the prescriber].”125 Chief Judge Lynch
wrote for a unanimous panel that the law, despite only permitting in-state
prescribers from opting out of this data collection,
does not discriminate against out-of-state entities in favor of in-state
competitors[.] Maine's law does not risk imposing regulatory obligations
inconsistent with those of other states. No other states have erected
competing regulations, much less opposing regulations requiring the
transfer of Maine prescribers' data. This is simply not an example of a state
engaged in economic protectionism. . . . Maine has not shifted the costs of
regulation to other states whose voters cannot affect its legislative choices,
nor does the Maine law “hand local businesses a victory they could not
obtain through the political process.” Maine’s political processes produced
this statute, and Maine voters can, if they disagree, reverse this policy.126

Though the Mills decision has been vacated on other grounds, its
reasoning still holds and offers a blueprint for a court adjudicating the
CCPA’s constitutionality under the Dormant Commerce Clause. As was
the case for the Maine statute, California’s CCPA does not favor its own
businesses at the cost of the other forty-nine states. If anything, California
businesses are at a disadvantage vis-à-vis their American (and
international) competition given the costs required to comply with the
law.127 Again, like Maine’s statute, California faces no state or federal
competition in data governance, as other states and Congress have thus

122. IMS Health Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7 (1st Cir. 2010), cert. granted, judgment vacated on other
grounds sub nom. IMS Health, Inc. v. Schneider, 564 U.S. 1051 (2011), and abrogated on other grounds
by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011).
123. See generally id.
124. Id. at 12.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 28-29
127. See infra Part III.B.6.a.
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far failed to act.128 And, finally, like Maine’s statute, the CCPA was
enacted via the legislative process and can be tinkered with or reversed at
the will of the people.129
2. Even If the CCPA Were Incorrectly Deemed Discriminatory, It Was
Enacted To Serve a Legitimate Legislative Purpose
Even if a court were to find the CCPA discriminatory, discrimination
is not a per se a death knell under Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. Rather, a law that may otherwise be considered
discriminatory will be upheld if it was not enacted as a discriminatory and
protectionist measure. The law must instead “serve a legitimate local
purpose, and [said] purpose must be one that cannot be served as well by
available nondiscriminatory means.”130
The quintessential case determining a discriminatory but legitimate
rule is the Supreme Court’s 1926 decision in Oregon-Washington
Railroad & Navigation Company v. Washington (“OregonWashington”).131 In that case, the plaintiff challenged a Washington
regulation that barred shipments of alfalfa from neighboring states whose
fields had been infested by “an injurious insect popularly called the alfalfa
weevil, and scientifically known as the phytonomus posticus, which fed
upon the leaves and foliage of the alfalfa plant, to the great damage of the
crop[.]”132 While the statute discriminated against neighboring states, the
Washington Director of Agriculture investigated the “areas where such
pests existed” and determined that those areas would be the ones from
which alfalfa could not be imported, thus predicating the statute.133 The
Court upheld the regulation in large part due to this investigation, stating
that the Dormant Commerce Clause did not invalidate the law because:
the investigation required by the Washington law and the investigation
actually made into the existence of this pest and its geographical location
ma[de] the law a real quarantine law and not a mere inhibition against
importation of alfalfa from a large part of the country without regard to the
condition which might make its importation dangerous.134

The Court’s reasoning in Oregon–Washington has been reaffirmed in
a wide range of fields of legislation and regulation; indeed, the Court
made clear that such laws can be “directed toward any number of
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.

See infra note 153.
See supra Part III.A.
Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 140 (1986).
270 U.S. 87 (1926).
Oregon-Washington R. & Nav. Co. v. Washington, 270 U.S. 87, 90 (1926).
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 96.
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legitimate goals unrelated to protectionism.”135 Some of these regulations
have been a bit more mundane. For example, the Supreme Court upheld
“Maine’s ban on the importation of live baitfish” because the ban was
enacted to guard against “the effect that baitfish parasites and nonnative
species could have on Maine’s fisheries.”136 The Ninth Circuit upheld
“California’s regulatory experiment seeking to decrease GHG emissions
and create a market that recognizes the harmful costs of products with a
high carbon intensity,” despite the fact that the law used regional
classifications in its scheme.137 Finally, the Supreme Court of Kentucky
upheld a regulation that barred owners of newly claimed thoroughbred
horses in Kentucky from racing those horses at out-of-state tracks for a
short time period but permitted them to race the horses at particular tracks
within the state because such a rule was “necessary to [the] classification
of thoroughbreds for competitive racing,” which was itself a requirement
for the heavily regulated horse-racing industry in Kentucky.138
None can deny that privacy is a legitimate purpose in the same vein as
environmental safety and food safety.139 The CCPA realizes that right in
a digital world. It should therefore still be upheld as non-violative of the
Dormant Commerce Clause even if it was determined to have an
incidentally discriminatory impact on other states.
3. The CCPA Does Not Dictate Extraterritorial Conduct140
The Supreme Court has also held that a law which effectively
135. United Haulers Assn., Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Authority, 550 U.S. 330,
343 (2007).
136. Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131, 151, 148 (1986).
137. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1097 (9th Cir. 2013).
138. Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm'n, 488 S.W.3d 594, 619 (Ky. 2016).
139. Cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), holding modified on other grounds by Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (“The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of
privacy. In a line of decisions, however . . . the Court has recognized that a right of personal privacy, or a
guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution.”). This author would
also argue that privacy is far more important than the integrity of claiming races in Kentucky but will
spare the reader from wading into those waters here.
140. While most courts view the extraterritorial inquiry as wholly separate from that of the
discrimination, the distinction is likely made for sake of clarity rather than legal requirement.
Nowhere did the Supreme Court suggest that the two lines of cases are mutually exclusive; indeed,
so-called ‘discrimination” cases . . . rely heavily on so-called “extraterritorial effect” cases . . . and
vice versa. [B]oth types of cases may share the common element of “state laws that are facially
neutral but have the effect of eliminating a competitive advantage possessed by out-of-state firms,
[thus] trigger [ing] heightened scrutiny.” Thus, while it may sometimes be useful to consider the
two types of cases separately for ease of analysis, they are actually just two forms
of discrimination, with significant overlap.
Cloverland-Green Spring Dairies, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Milk Mktg. Bd., 462 F.3d 249, 262 n.15 (3rd Cir.
2006) (internal citations omitted); see also Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor
Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986) (“there is no clear line separating the category of state regulation that is
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“regulates out-of-state transactions” violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause.141 As the Court has explained, “[t]he limits on a State’s power to
enact substantive legislation are similar to the limits on the jurisdiction of
state courts. In either case, ‘any attempt “directly” to assert extraterritorial
jurisdiction over persons or property would offend sister States and
exceed the inherent limits of the State’s power.’”142
In Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Authority,
the Supreme Court adjudicated a statute that required a distillery that
posted specific prices in New York to wait up to a month before
modifying its pricing scheme anywhere else in the United States.143
“Forcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one State before
undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates interstate
commerce,” the Court concluded.144 Under this reasoning, the Court has
also invalidated rules that “control train operations beyond the boundaries
of the state exacting it because of the necessity of breaking up and
reassembling long trains at the nearest terminal points before entering and
after leaving the regulating state.”145
In Healy v. Beer Institute, the Supreme Court explained the
extraterritoriality inquiries under the Dormant Commerce Clause:
The principles guiding [an extraterritoriality] assessment, principles made
clear in Brown–Forman and in the cases upon which it relied, reflect the
Constitution’s special concern both with the maintenance of a national
economic union unfettered by state-imposed limitations on interstate
commerce and with the autonomy of the individual States with their
respective spheres. Taken together, our cases concerning the
extraterritorial effects of state economic regulation stand at a minimum for
the following propositions: First, the “Commerce Clause ... precludes the
application of a state statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside
of the State’s borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the
State” … . Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring
wholly outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the
enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the statute's
extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. The critical inquiry is
whether the practical effect of the regulation is to control conduct beyond
the boundaries of the State. Third, the practical effect of the statute must
be evaluated not only by considering the consequences of the statute itself,
virtually per se invalid under the Commerce Clause, and the category subject to the Pike v. Bruce
Church balancing approach.”). This article also adopts this solely as a framing mechanism rather than
suggesting the two tests are wholly inapposite to one another.
141. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. 573 at 582.
142. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 643 (1982) (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186,
197 (1977)).
143. 476 U.S. at 582.
144. Id.
145. S. Pac. Co. v. State of Ariz. ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945).
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but also by considering how the challenged statute may interact with the
legitimate regulatory regimes of other States and what effect would arise if
not one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.146

The CCPA misses the mark for all three inquiries. This section details
what each of these standards requires and why the CCPA fails to
aggravate the Clause under the inverse standards.
a. The CCPA Neither Applies To Nor Controls Commerce Wholly
Outside California’s Jurisdiction
The first inquiry under the extraterritorial examination is whether a
state statute “directly regulates transactions which take place across state
lines[.]”147 The quintessential case explicating this legal principle is
Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth.148 In that
case, the Supreme Court struck down a provision in the New York
Alcoholic Beverage Control Law “that required liquor distillers and
producers doing business in New York to affirm that their prices were no
higher than the lowest price at which the same product would be sold in
any other state during the month.”149 The statute also made it illegal for a
distiller to lower its prices in other states without ex anti permission from
The Court determined that New York was
said states.150
unconstitutionally regulating commerce outside of the state; as the
justices wrote, “[f]orcing a merchant to seek regulatory approval in one
State before undertaking a transaction in another directly regulates
interstate commerce.”151 The CCPA, on the other hand, does no such
thing.
The CCPA’s privacy regime binds only California businesses.
Specifically, the law defines a “business” to which the law applies as:
A sole proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
association, or other legal entity that is organized or operated for the profit
or financial benefit of its shareholders or other owners, that collects
consumers’ personal information, or on the behalf of which such
information is collected and that alone, or jointly with others, determines
the purposes and means of the processing of consumers’ personal
information, that does business in the State of California[.]152

146. 491 U.S. 324, 336–37 (1989) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (modifications in original).
147. Edgar, 457 U.S. at 641.
148. 476 U.S. 573 (1986).
149. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 311 (1st Cir. 2005) (citing Brown–Forman
Distillers Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986)).
150. Brown–Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 579.
151. Id. at 582.
152. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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Therefore, it cannot be said that any such information collection and sale
occurs “wholly outside the state’s borders[.]”153 Unlike the liquor law at
issue in Brown-Forman, the CCPA does not affect the actions of
businesses operating in other states. It does “not insist that producers or
consumers in other States surrender whatever competitive advantages
they may possess.”154 If anything, the CCPA disadvantages California
vis-à-vis other states and surrenders an in-state business’ competitive
advantage. As such, it cannot be the case that the CCPA is deemed to
either regulate or control conduct outside of the Golden State.
b. These Conclusions Remain Intact Even If Other States Enact Similar
Legislation
The final instruction of the Dormant Commerce Clause is to ensure that
the two prior conclusions remain intact should any other state enact
similar legislation.155 This is animated by the general principle that
“the Commerce Clause protects against inconsistent legislation arising
from the projection of one state regulatory regime into the jurisdiction of
another State.”156 As of September 2019, “[f]ive bills based on the CCPA
[we]re still pending in states where the legislature remains in session—
one each in Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island, and two in
New York—and it is possible that one of these could gain legislative
traction.”157 Still, if any or all of these laws were to be enacted, the
conclusions in the previous section would remain intact.
If other states enact their own versions of the CCPA, then entities that
do business in such states will be subject to that specific law. Companies
can locate consumers via IP addresses; this information can act as a gating
function such that IP addresses from one state will initiate one set of
disclosures, whereas an IP address stemming from another state will
initiate another. Alternatively, companies can easily prompt a user to
153. Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 642 (1982).
154. Brown-Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 580.
155. See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
156. Id. at 336-37 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987)).
157. Jonathan G. Cederbaum, D. Reed Foreman Jr., & Lydia Lichlyter, While Congressional Action
Stalls, States Continue To Advance Privacy Legislation, WILMERHALE PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY
LAW BLOG (July 1, 2019), https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/blogs/WilmerHale-Privacy-andCybersecurity-Law/20190701-while-congressional-action-stalls-states-continue-to-advance-privacylegislation [https://perma.cc/BV67-GTUX]. These five do not include other state legislative efforts that
have failed in Washington, Texas, Illinois, Louisiana, and Nevada based at least in part on the CCPA. See
Jonathan G. Cederbaum, D. Reed Foreman Jr., & Lydia Lichlyter, Current Status of State Privacy
Legislation – A WilmerHale Update, WILMERHALE PRIVACY AND CYBERSECURITY LAW BLOG (Apr. 30,
2019),
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/blogs/WilmerHale-Privacy-and-CybersecurityLaw/20190430-current-status-of-state-privacy-legislation-a-wilmerhale-update [https://perma.cc/25NATGGP].
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identify the state from which he or she is browsing, which would trigger
the requisite protections. In short, this is viable from a technological
standpoint.
The genuine patchwork of laws currently governing data breaches
demonstrates that the system can survive multiple state regulations.
These laws govern the types of data that, if improperly disclosed or
breached, trigger user notifications, and govern which types of businesses
are subject to these laws. At present, there exists no federal data breach
notification law. As of 2018 “all 50 states (plus D.C., Guam, Puerto Rico,
and the Virgin Islands) have passed data breach notification laws.”158
“While most state data breach notification statutes contain similar
components, there are important differences”159 in each. Social security
numbers are ubiquitously recognized, but, for example, only Colorado
requires user notification if a student identification card number is
breached.160 That these different, sometimes conflicting, regimes
continue to operate successfully is proof that the Internet can survive with
different state laws governing it and those who use it. Therefore, even if
multiple states enact similar CCPA legislation, the numerous pieces of
legislation will not interact in such a way that violates the Dormant
Commerce Clause.
4. The CCPA Does Not Conflict With Otherwise Uniform Laws
Statutes or laws may be invalidated “under the [D]ormant Commerce
Clause that appear to have been genuinely nondiscriminatory, in the sense
that they did not impose disparate treatment on similarly situated in-state
and out-of-state interests, where such laws undermined a compelling need
for national uniformity in regulation.”161 This is often the case when
states enact additional, albeit modest, regulations to industries already
highly regulated by the vast majority of states or by the federal
government;162 such laws, while “enacted to advance laudable local
158. Petrina McDaniel & Keshia Lipscomb, Data Breach Laws on the Books in Every State;
Federal Data Breach Law Hangs in the Balance, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS: SECURITY & PRIVACY // BYTES
BLOG (Apr. 30, 2018), https://www.securityprivacybytes.com/2018/04/data-breach-laws-on-the-booksin-every-state-federal-data-breach-law-hangs-in-the-balance/ [https://perma.cc/TZC2-P782].
159. Thomas Chisena et al., State Data Breach Notification Laws, JDSUPRA (July 2, 2019),
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/state-data-breach-notification-laws-64843/ [https://perma.cc/95CDPUJH].
160. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-716 (1)(G).
161. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278, 299 n.12 (1997); see also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69, 88 (1987) (“This Court’s recent Commerce Clause cases also have
invalidated statutes that may adversely affect interstate commerce by subjecting activities to inconsistent
regulations”).
162. See Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (conflict in state laws governing
truck mud flaps); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (conflict in state
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purposes” nevertheless “pose undue burdens on interstate commerce” by
creating conflict among the states.163 To be sure, this rule, too, is not
absolute, as an advancement “may be so compelling that the innovating
State need not be the one to give way.”164 For better or for worse, that
simply is not the case with the CCPA.
In the Supreme Court’s first major decision pertaining to the Internet,
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, the Court stated: “The Internet
is an international network of interconnected computers.”165 Despite its
interconnectedness, federal regulations have been anything but unified.
As Nuala O’Connor recently wrote in a report published by the Council
on Foreign Relations, “[r]ather than a comprehensive legal protection for
personal data, the United States has only a patchwork of sector-specific
laws that fail to adequately protect data.”166 The New York Times likewise
compared the disjointed regulatory schema to a “patchwork quilt” and “a
macramé arrangement.”167
The federal government and other states have explored enacting
CCPA-like legislation. The same animating principles that guided
Allistair MacTaggert’s push for his ballot initiative, and the California
legislature’s enactment of the CCPA, have found their way into hearings
and bills across the country.168 Because bills like the CCPA are on the
horizon across the country, courts need not concern themselves with this
aspect of Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine.
5. Burdens Are Not Excessive in Relation to Benefits
Even if a state law does not discriminate against out-of-state actors, it
may nevertheless be struck down under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.169 The Court has repeatedly reasoned that the Clause demands
courts strike down laws that burden interstate commerce far more than
they benefit the state’s population.170 This standard was most explicitly
articulated in the Supreme Court’s Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. decision

laws regarding train lengths).
163. Browning-Ferris, Inc. v. Anne Arundel Cty., Maryland, 438 A.2d 269, 276 (Md. 1981).
164. Bibb, 359 U.S. at 530.
165. Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997).
166. Nuala O’Connor, Reforming the U.S. Approach to Data Protection and Privacy, COUNCIL
FOR. RELATIONS (Jan. 30, 2018), https://www.cfr.org/report/reforming-us-approach-data-protection.
167. Natasha Singer, An American Quilt of Privacy Laws, Incomplete, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2012),
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/31/technology/in-privacy-laws-an-incomplete-american-quilt.html
168. See supra Part III.B.3.b.
169. See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 353 (2008) (“Concluding that a state law
does not amount to forbidden discrimination against interstate commerce is not the death knell of all
dormant Commerce Clause challenges.”).
170. See Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443 (1960).
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where the Court presented what has become known as the Pike test:171
Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate local
public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.172

Therefore, whether the CCPA will stand turns both on a court’s
interpretation of the CCPA’s intent as well as the extent to which it
burdens commerce among states.
a. Factors Favoring Upholding the CCPA
Within the Pike balancing exercise, there is no clear-cut answer.
However, two categories of factors, doctrinaire factors and historical
precedent, favor upholding the CCPA in a Pike balancing test.
i. Doctrinaire Factors
As the Supreme Court has previously said with respect to the balancing
of burdens and benefits of non-discriminatory state laws, “[w]e deal not
with absolutes but with questions of degree.”173 Several important factors
militate toward a finding that the CCPA is in fact constitutional.
First, the CCPA meets the rational basis standard. When performing a
Pike analysis, “a court should focus ultimately on the regulatory purposes
identified by the lawmakers and on the evidence before or available to
them that might have supported their judgment.”174 Thus, the court ought
to return to a rational basis examination, namely “whether the lawmakers
could rationally have believed that the challenged regulation would foster
those purposes.”175
The court analyzed regulations through a rational basis test in Raymond
Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice.176 In that case, the Court struck down a
Wisconsin regulation “governing the length and configuration of

171. See, e.g., United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S.
330, 346 (2007) (referring to it as the “Pike test”); C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.
383, 390 (1994) (same). It has also been referred to as the “Pike balancing test.” Oregon Waste Sys., Inc.
v. Dep't of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 100 (1994); see also Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 553 U.S.
328, 353 (2008) (referring to “the rule” in Pike); Gov't Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc. v. Bayh, 975
F.2d 1267, 1273 (7th Cir. 1992) (referring to Pike as the “standard”).
172. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
173. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 530 (1959).
174. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 680 (1981) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (citing Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981)).
175. Id.
176. 434 U.S. 429 (1978).
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trucks.”177 Specifically:
State law allow[ed] 65-foot doubles to be operated on interstate highways
and access roads in Michigan, Illinois, Minnesota, and all of the States west
from Minnesota to Washington through which Interstate Highways 90 and
94 run . . . Wisconsin law, however, generally does not allow trucks longer
than 55 feet to be operated on highways within that State.178

The Court ultimately found that Wisconsin’s unique restriction could not
be supported even on a rational basis. This was largely because
“[t]he State produced no evidence nor has it made any suggestion in this
Court, that 65-foot doubles are less safe than 55-foot singles because of
their extra trailer, as distinguished from their extra length.”179 The Court
took specific notice of the fact “that 65 foot twin trailers have as good a
safety record as other large vehicles.”180
Notwithstanding the criticisms levied against the CCPA,181 it is highly
doubtful that a court could conclude that the law provides no tangible
privacy benefits or protections to Californians. Indeed, courts are not “to
determine which [alternative regulatory scheme] is best suited to achieve
a valid state objective. Policy decisions are for the state legislature, absent
federal entry into the field.”182 Because the CCPA is likely to, at the very
least, make progress towards the goals it aims to achieve, it is likely to
satisfy this standard.
Second, California’s case will be aided by the fact that Congress has
failed to enact privacy legislation of the same stripe. “It has long been
recognized that, ‘in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress,
there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters
of local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate
commerce or even, to some extent, regulate it.’”183 Because Congress has
failed to protect Internet users’ privacy, courts would seemingly be loath
to restrict states that aim to fill the void.
Finally, there is the overarching purpose of the Dormant Commerce
Clause itself. As the Supreme Court has affirmed:
In determining whether the state has imposed an undue burden on interstate
commerce, it must be borne in mind that the Constitution when “conferring
upon Congress the regulation of commerce, . . . never intended to cut the
177. Id. at 430.
178. Id. at 432.
179. Id. at 437–38.
180. Id. at 438 n.12.
181. See supra Part III.B.4.
182. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
183. Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp. of Delaware, 450 U.S. 662, 669–70 (1981) (quoting S.
Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 767 (1945)); id. at 671 (“In the absence of congressional action to set
uniform standards, some burdens associated with state safety regulations must be tolerated.”).
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States off from legislating on all subjects relating to the health, life, and
safety of their citizens, though the legislation might indirectly affect the
commerce of the country. Legislation, in a great variety of ways, may affect
commerce and persons engaged in it without constituting a regulation of it,
within the meaning of the Constitution.”184

These doctrine-driven factors weigh heavily in favor of upholding the
law.
ii. Historical Precedent
This is not the first article to examine the relationship between the
Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause. In 2001, professors Jack
Goldsmith and Alan Sykes outlined the potentially fraught relationship in
a prescient essay published in the Yale Law Journal:185
To see how the [D]ormant Commerce Clause has been applied to the
Internet, consider the leading case of American Libraries Ass’n v.
Pataki. American Libraries Ass’n enjoined enforcement of a New York
statute that prohibited the intentional use of the Internet “to initiate or
engage” in certain pornographic communications deemed to be “harmful
to minors.” In enjoining enforcement of the law, the American Libraries
Ass’n court reasoned as follows: Because it is difficult for content
providers to control access to their websites and communications, a content
provider outside New York might inadvertently send proscribed content
into New York. Fear of liability in New York thus might chill the activities
of a content provider operating legally in California, thereby affecting
legitimate commerce wholly outside New York. Moreover, because states
regulate pornographic communications differently, “a single actor might
be subject to haphazard, uncoordinated, and even outright inconsistent
regulation by states that the actor never intended to reach and possibly was
unaware were being accessed.” These extraordinary burdens on Internet
communication were said to outweigh any regulatory benefit in New York.
In sum, “the Internet is one of those areas of commerce that must be marked
off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent legislation that,
taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of the Internet
altogether.”186

Despite Goldsmith and Sykes’s warning that viewing the Internet as
solely a national medium effortlessly crossing state boundaries “threatens
to invalidate nearly every state regulation of Internet communications,”187
184. Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, Mich., 362 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1960) (quoting
Sherlock v. Alling, 93 U.S. 99, 103 (1876)).
185. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110
YALE L. J. 785 (2001).
186. Id. at 786.
187. Id. at 787.
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courts adjudicating analogous cases have generally been unwilling to
extend American Libraries and are instead largely upholding Internet
regulations. Why? Because of American Libraries’s logic.
The [American Libraries] court concluded the statute contravened the
Dormant Commerce Clause for three reasons: (1) the statute projected New
York law “into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York”; (2) the
burdens of the statute on interstate commerce exceed any local benefit
derived from it; and (3) the internet is a “national preserve” that must not
be subjected to inconsistent state legislation that could, when taken to its
extreme, “paralyze development of the internet altogether.”188

However, none of these factors apply to many Internet regulations,
including the CCPA.
Take Rousso v. State of Washington, for example. In Rousso, the
plaintiff challenged the State of Washington’s ban on Internet
gambling.189 The Supreme Court of Washington, sitting en banc, held that
the law indeed
impose[d] a burden on interstate commerce by walling off the Washington
market for Internet gambling from interstate commerce. [But] this burden
is mitigated somewhat. First, the ban does not prevent or hinder Internet
gambling businesses from operating throughout the rest of the world.
Second, those businesses can easily exclude Washingtonians.190

Therefore, the court denied relief under the Dormant Commerce Clause
and thought American Libraries need not be extended or replicated with
respect to that particular statute.191
Similar results can be found where courts upheld more recent state
regulations of Internet conduct over Dormant Commerce Clause
challenges. For example, the Tenth Circuit upheld a Kansas statute
regulating payday lenders’ use of the Internet to engage in transactions
with Kansans.192 The Fifth Circuit upheld a Texas statute barring car
manufacturers from directly retailing automobiles to consumers online.193
The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld a statute that prohibited one person
from assuming another’s identity online.194 The Court of Special Appeals
in Maryland upheld the Maryland Commercial Electronic Mail Act,
which required that commercial e-mail sent to Maryland residents or sent

188. Ex parte Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d 665, 680 (Tex. App. 2016) (citing Am. Libraries Ass'n v.
Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
189. Rousso v. State of Washington, 239 P.3d 1084, 1086 (Wash. 2010).
190. Id. at 1090.
191. Id. at 1092.
192. Quik Payday, Inc. v. Stork, 549 F.3d 1302, 1313 (10th Cir. 2008).
193. Ford Motor Co. v. Texas Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493, 505 (5th Cir. 2001).
194. Ex parte Bradshaw, 501 S.W.3d at 680.
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from equipment located in Maryland be truthful and non-deceptive.195
The Supreme Court of Washington upheld a similar law.196 Finally, the
California Court of Appeal upheld a law that “required that sellers of
water treatment devices (to California consumers) that make ‘health
claims’ regarding those devices have those devices certified by the
Department of Health Services,” including when such representations are
made online.197 Importantly, the courts in all but one of these cases (the
Tenth Circuit) cited American Libraries; these courts found its logical
reasoning insufficiently persuasive and found the facts at issue in their
cases sufficiently distinguishable from American Libraries to overcome
any persuasive, albeit non-binding, impact that American Libraries
opinion may have held.
The result of these decisions is that the Internet, while a “national
preserve,”198 is far from immune to state laws aiming to protect its citizens
therefrom—or more accurately, from those who would take advantage of
the Internet to the detriment of the states’ citizens. Such precedent can
itself be considered when calculating the incalculable benefits and
burdens, as demanded by the Pike test.
Of course, we must also consider the factors pointing in the other
direction.
6. Purported Factors Favoring Striking Down the CCPA
Critics of the CCPA, including those who would argue that it violates
the Dormant Commerce Clause, can point to two distinct drawbacks of
the legislation: the cost of compliance and its lack of related regulations.
Notably, however, these arguments can be substantially blunted.
a. Compliance Costs and Fines Are Too Expensive
A critic challenging the law could argue that the costs of compliance
are too high. Few estimates of compliance costs have been published—
the lone estimate made readily available at the time of this article’s
publishing by a non-profit estimated that costs of getting a business up to
speed in terms of compliance with the CCPA could be as high as $50,000
to $100,000 per year.199 Because the law has only recently gone into
195. MaryCLE, LLC v. First Choice Internet, Inc., 890 A.2d 818, 840–45 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
2006).
196. See generally State v. Heckel, 24 P.3d 404, 406-07 (Wash. 2001).
197. People ex rel. Brown v. PuriTec, 64 Cal. Rptr. 3d 270, 275–79 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007), as
modified (Aug. 15, 2007).
198. Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 169 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
199. Alan L. Friel, California’s New Privacy Law: What You Need to Know Now, TRANSFORMING
DATA WITH INTELLIGENCE (Oct. 11, 2018), https://tdwi.org/articles/2018/10/11/biz-all-california-
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effect, no empirical data is available, however. Several factors outside of
estimates suggest that the non-profit’s estimation is likely not entirely off
the mark, but persuasive counterarguments blunt this argument entirely.
First, some cost-benefit analysis studies on privacy regimes broadly
suggest that privacy statutes akin to the CCPA provide insufficient
benefits. One such estimate, for example, asserted that the law would
produce a $7 – $8 billion loss annually.200 To arrive at that conclusion,
the American Enterprise Institute’s (AEI) Roslyn Layton adopted the
findings of a study performed by Daniel Pérez, a Senior Policy Analyst
from the George Washington University Regulatory Studies Center.
Pérez adopted previous estimates of consumers’ willingness to pay
(WTP) for privacy regulations and calculated the monetary value of
privacy regulations “by WTP for a typical privacy configured app ($3.47),
the average number of apps per user (23), the lump sum WTP for privacy
functionality ($13.77), and the number of smartphone users willing to pay
for such services (generously estimated to be 25 percent of 257,300,000
smartphone users).”201 Comparatively, AEI, purportedly parroting
review of Pérez’s unpublished work, “estimates the costs at $24.5 billion
for upfront compliance and lost advertising revenue. The present value of
the annualized costs are $57 – $63 billion in the coming decade. When
balanced against the benefits, the outcome is a total loss of $7 – $8
billion.”202
This critique can be forcefully blunted by attacking the underlying
assumptions of the study. For example, one need only look at the Pérez
presentation upon which the AEI based its conclusions to know that
Pérez’s study incorporates a lump sum WTP based on a figure calculated
in 2007.203 Data breaches of all types204 have “heightened concern about
privacy” from consumers, meaning that the figures used may significantly
undervalue the benefits consumers derive from privacy today, more than
ten years later. In another example, the subtitle of the entire presentation
makes clear that the study seeks to inform “U.S. federal [p]rivacy
[p]olicy.”205 AEI makes no effort to discuss whether Californians may

privacy-law.aspx [https://perma.cc/G8SF-NJLD].
200. Rosalyn Layton, The Costs of California’s Online Privacy Rules Far Exceed the Benefits, AM.
ENTER. INST. (Mar. 22, 2019), http://www.aei.org/publication/the-costs-of-californias-online-privacyrules-far-exceed-the-benefits/.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Daniel R. Pérez, Benefits and Costs of Privacy under Different Regimes: Using Back-of-theEnvelope BCA to Inform U.S. Federal Privacy Policy 11 (unpublished presentation) (on file with author).
204. See supra notes 3–4 and accompanying text.
205. Daniel R. Pérez, Benefits and Costs of Privacy under Different Regimes: Using Back-of-theEnvelope BCA to Inform U.S. Federal Privacy Policy 1 (unpublished presentation) (on file with author)
(emphasis added).
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have a higher WTP for whatever reasons, not the least of which is
because, given their proximity to the nation’s preeminent technology hub,
Silicon Valley, Californians may put more of their lives online and thus
be willing to pay more for privacy. It is not that Pérez’s study is
inaccurate, nor necessarily that AEI’s estimates are incorrect; rather, the
takeaway is that one cannot overrule the will of the people’s elected
legislature and elected executive for sake of one back-of-the-envelope
estimate.206 Thus, such studies should not alone justify overturning the
law.
Buttressing the critics’ argument, however, may be the enforcement
regime. This line of argument would proceed as follows: small businesses
that cannot afford to pay the requisite costs to ensure compliance, either
for sake of human capital or literal capital, will get fined a significant
amount of money for their insufficient controls. This regime is
sufficiently punitive insofar as it will result in driving the businesses to
close altogether, an outcome the legislature surely was not seeking.
True, fines may accumulate. This is particularly the case if the
company is on notice that their data privacy protocols are insufficient,
which could give rise to the “intentional” violation penalty. But this is
far from a guarantee; “although the imposition of a penalty for each
violation is mandatory, if a defendant presents credible evidence
establishing a true inability to pay, the court has discretion to impose a
relatively nominal penalty.”207 California courts have repeatedly affirmed
that pursuant to the statutory authority under which the Attorney General
would fine noncompliant companies, “the amount of the penalty lies
within the court’s discretion.”208 Therefore, fear of fines should not find
its way into a court’s calculus.
Notwithstanding the more superficial responses above, the question of
costs can be resoundingly answered at a more foundational level. Even
if, arguendo, one presumes that the AEI’s study was correct and that the
compliance regime slants unjustly against small businesses rendering the
costs of the CCPA as dramatically outweighing its benefits, the judiciary
simply should not, and will not, care. Not only are states traditionally
afforded “great latitude under their police powers to legislate as to the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons,”209
206. This is not to say that cost benefit analyses are not useful and should not, in other scenarios,
such as administrative regulations, drive policy-making. Cf. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, THE COST-BENEFIT
REVOLUTION (2018); Cass R. Sunstein, Is Cost-Benefit Analysis for Everyone?, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 299
(2001); Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1651 (2001).
207. People v. First Fed. Credit Corp., 128 Cal. Rptr. 2d 542, 548 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002).
208. Hewlett v. Squaw Valley Ski Corp., 63 Cal. Rptr. 2d 118, 141 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
209. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 756 (1985) (internal quotation
marks omitted); see also United Haulers Ass'n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550
U.S. 330, 342 (2007) (noting that governments are entitled to a wide berth of policy positions because
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but:
a court neither approves nor condemns any legislative policy. Its delicate
and difficult office is to ascertain and declare whether the legislation is in
accordance with, or in contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution;
and, having done that, its duty ends.210

Therefore, a court should discard an argument that a cost-benefit analysis
slants toward rejecting the CCPA.
A similar argument has been borne out in Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. When a petitioner challenged a California environmental
regulation under the Clause, citing, among other reasons, that the costs
outweighed the benefits, a unanimous panel discarded the argument.211
The judges stated: “[w]hether or not one agrees with the science
underlying those views, those [cost-benefit] determinations are
permissible ones for the legislature to make.”212 The result of this
foundational separation of powers principle is that the CCPA ought not
be overturned for sake of purported costs, even if a jurist “think[s] this
law is unwise, or even asinine”213 because that decision rests with the
legislature, not the courts.
b. No Sister Statutes
There is no analogue whatsoever to the CCPA anywhere in the country.
In essence, that means that only one state is driving the entirety of the
aforementioned costs. When other statutes have been challenged under
the Dormant Commerce Clause, courts have considered whether other
states have enacted similar burdens such that an individual regulation
does not itself create a substantial marginal cost.214
In State v. Maybee, the Court of Appeals of Oregon evaluated an
Oregon statute that corrected violations of the Master Settlement
Agreement (Agreement). Oregon, in addition to forty-six other states,
entered into this Agreement with major tobacco companies.215 In
performing its balancing test, the court was careful to note that
“the burden on interstate commerce is minimal, in light of the fact that 46
“[u]nlike private enterprise, government is vested with the responsibility of protecting the health, safety,
and welfare of its citizens.”).
210. United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63 (1936); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,
482 (1965) (courts “do not sit as a super-legislature to determine the wisdom, need, and propriety of laws
that touch economic problems, business affairs, or social conditions.”).
211. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1106 (9th Cir. 2013).
212. Id.
213. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 527 (1965) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
214. Admittedly, this fact pattern is not all too frequent, as such statutes are likely challenged under
the Clause before other states could enact analogues.
215. State v. Maybee, 232 P.3d 970, 971 (Or. 2010).
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other states have similar statutes.”216 The Supreme Court of Kentucky
also noted, in adjudicating a cause of action regarding horse racing, that
the regulations were “similar (often identical) to regulations in effect in
the large majority of states that allow wagering on thoroughbred horse
races[.]”217
The argument that the CCPA imposes a unique burden is substantially
undercut with the advent of the GDPR.
According to Cynthia Cole, special counsel in the Palo Alto technology
practice at the law firm Baker Botts, “GDPR and the CCPA are largely
consistent with significant overlap.” Cole, [sic] said the data mapping
exercises undertaken by U.S. firms in preparation of GDPR will put them
in a better starting position for the preparation efforts.218

PricewaterhouseCoopers has come to a similar conclusion.219 Not only
will overlapping provisions of the GDPR and the CCPA assist in
efficiency to bring companies up to compliance on the latter regime, but
the overlap also undercuts the burden itself under the Pike test. Because
many companies that need to comply with CCPA are most likely already
en route or fully compliant with GDPR, the California law cannot be said
to be the sole factor for this increased cost.
If other states have analogously costly regulations, the burdens are less
burdensome under the Pike test, as those subject to regulations are
essentially on notice of said burden. The federal district court in the
Western District of Tennessee espoused this reasoning when adjudicating
the constitutionality of a Tennessee statute, thereby requiring suppliers to
repurchase a retailer’s inventory after the parties terminate a contract.220
While not identical, the CCPA, like the GDPR, was designed to put
companies on notice far before the effects of the legislation would be felt.
This notice affords companies a significant amount of time to understand
the law’s impact on their business, become compliant with the law, and
amortize the cost of doing so. The GDPR was first proposed in January
of 2012 and was adopted in April of 2016; it entered into force in May of

216. Id. at 977.
217. Jamgotchian v. Kentucky Horse Racing Comm’n, 488 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Ky. 2016).
218. Todd Ehret, Data privacy and GDPR at one year, a U.S. perspective. Part Two - U.S.
challenges ahead, REUTERS (May 29, 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bc-finreg-gdpr-reportcard-2/data-privacy-and-gdpr-at-one-year-a-u-s-perspective-part-two-u-s-challenges-aheadidUSKCN1SZ1US [https://perma.cc/G6HE-KHJ4].
219. Your Readiness Roadmap for the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA),
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, https://www.pwc.com/us/en/services/consulting/cybersecurity/californiaconsumer-privacy-act.html [https://perma.cc/GCE6-A5FJ] (“Certain CCPA requirements overlap with
the existing GDPR individual rights requirements, which may give GDPR-ready organizations a jump
start on building a capability around user-data handling practices.”).
220. Power & Tel. Supply Co. v. Harmonic, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 2d 981, 991 (W.D. Tenn. 2003).
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2016, and ultimately became valid and enforceable in July of 2018.221
The CCPA also provided over eighteen months between when the law
was enacted and when it goes into force, thereby providing companies
with significant notice, as desired by the district court.222
V. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the California Consumer Privacy Act should withstand
any challenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause. To come to this
conclusion, the article began by reviewing the context in which the CCPA
was enacted and the text of the law itself, including its detailed and multifaceted regime. Thereafter, the article reviewed the Clause’s first
principles and the ways in which a statute could be invalidated under the
Clause. In short, the CCPA withstands all such avenues of attack. First,
it does not discriminate against out-of-state businesses; even if it did, such
discriminatory effect is forgivable as it was enacted with a legitimate
legislative purpose, thereby justifying any incidental discrimination.
Moreover, the law does not dictate extraterritorial conduct, nor does it
conflict with other states’ (currently non-existent) regulatory regimes.
Finally, the benefits of privacy outweigh the burdens the law creates.
The CCPA is an important development in the ongoing debates over
consumer privacy and protection. If nothing else, it will eventually
provide a useful data point as to whether analogous safety regulations are
in fact a juice worth squeezing for other states’ legislatures.

221. The History of the General Data Protection Regulation, EUROPEAN DATA PROTECTION
SUPERVISOR,
https://edps.europa.eu/data-protection/data-protection/legislation/history-general-dataprotection-regulation_en [https://perma.cc/6SPY-5AMH].
222. This counterargument is itself undermined by the fact that “consumers may make requests to
in-scope business for the 2019 calendar year . . . since the ‘look back’ requirement for record-keeping
provisions started January 1, 2019.” Ty Sbano, What Your Data Security Team Needs to Know About the
CCPA, TechBeacon (Apr. 22, 2019), https://techbeacon.com/security/what-your-data-security-teamneeds-know-about-ccpa [https://perma.cc/KE4H-RKGD]. Nonetheless, the overall thrust of the argument
remains intact and a compelling counterpoint to the question of notice and burdens.
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